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Abstract—Current In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) connect Elec-
tronic Control Units (ECUs) via domain busses. A gateway
forwards messages between these domains. Automotive Ethernet
emerges as a flat, high-speed backbone technology for IVNs
that carries the various control flows within Ethernet frames.
Recently, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has been identified
as a useful building block of the vehicular domain, as it allows
the differentiation of packets based on all header fields and thus
can isolate unrelated control flows.
In this work, we systematically explore the different strategies
for integrating automotive control flows in switched Ether-
networks and analyze their security impact for a software-
defined IVN. We discuss how control flow identifiers can be
embedded on different layers resulting in a range of solutions
from fully exposed embedding to deep encapsulation. We evaluate
these strategies in a realistic IVN based on the communication
matrix of a production grade vehicle, which we map into a
modern Ethernet topology. We find that visibility of automotive
control flows within packet headers is essential for the network
infrastructure to enable isolation and access control. With an
exposed embedding, the SDN backbone can establish and survey
trust zones within the IVN and largely reduce the attack surface
of connected cars. An exposed embedding strategy also minimizes
communication expenses.
Index Terms—Automotive Ethernet, IVN, SOME/IP, flow sep-
aration, SDN, network experimentation
I. INTRODUCTION
In-Vehicle Networks (IVNs) connect sensors, actuators,
and Electronic Control Units (ECUs) which are traditionally
attached to bus systems such as the Controller Area Network
(CAN). In recent years, automotive Ethernet has emerged
as the high bandwidth communication technology for in-car
backbones, which will soon form switched, flat topologies [1].
At the network edge, local gateways will then embed control
communication of buses into Ethernet frames.
Traditionally, IVNs are organized in domains such as info-
tainment, powertrain, and comfort and each ECU is part of one
domain. The communication matrix of a vehicle specifies all
communication relations between ECUs. A common approach
to bring those control flows onto the Ethernet backbone is
by encapsulating bus messages into upper protocol layers
such as SOME/IP—a tunneling approach. Residing in an
application-layer protocol, the network neither can identify the
control messages nor is it aware of the actual endpoints. With
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increasingly interconnected ECUs this can open new attack
vectors as every gateway participating in the tunnelling layer is
able to send and receive any message in that tunnel. In contrast,
control messages can be directly embedded in Ethernet frames
using multicast destination addresses specific to message types
and domain-specific VLAN IDs. This keeps communication
contexts exposed to the switching infrastructure and each
vehicular control flow can be precisely identified.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) was first introduced in
campus networks [2] and promises to reduce the complexity
of network control while increasing adaptability. In SDN, a
central controller manages the control plane of the network.
Network devices decide on the forwarding of packets based
on a programmable matching pipeline managed by the con-
troller via the OpenFlow protocol. The OpenFlow forwarding
pipeline identifies network flows based on header information
from layer 2 to layer 4. In recent years, use cases for SDN
extended to the vehicular domain [3]. The SDN matching
pipeline promises to be a powerful tool that can precisely
identify and separate control flows in the network.
In this work, we compare strategies to integrate control
flows in a software-defined in-vehicle Ethernet backbone and
analyse their impact on the security and performance of the
IVN. We compare the hidden tunneling approach with an
exposed layer 2 embedding and show how identifiers of a
control flow can be embedded at different layers. We evaluate
the integration strategies in a realistic IVN based on the CAN
network of a production car, which we transformed into a
modern SDN-controlled Ethernet topology.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews automotive Ethernet and related work. Sec-
tion III illustrates the design space for embedding control flows
in software-defined IVN and discusses the corresponding im-
pact on network design. Security and performance evaluations
of the different integration strategies are shown in Section IV.
Finally, Section V concludes with an outlook on future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Modern cars implement functions using sensors, actuators
and ECUs that are linked via a combination of traditional bus
systems and Ethernet technologies for newly selected links.
We use CAN control flows as an example to discuss the
integration of traditional bus communication into Ethernet.
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In-vehicle control communication is precisely defined, and
the content of messages is known. All installed ECUs and their
communication relations are specified in the communication
matrix of a vehicle. Each control flow in the matrix has exactly
one sender, a list of receivers, and a CAN ID which is a unique
vehicle wide identifier. Each ECU belongs to one domain (e.g.,
drivetrain) and the domain of a control flow is determined
based on its sending ECU.
ECUs in current vehicles are grouped in functional domains
and interconnected by proprietary bus systems. These domains
often physically extend over large regions of the car. Functions
based on information from different domains require messages
transferred from one domain to another via a central gateway.
The stepwise transition to flat Ethernet introduces processing
clusters that are connected via a switched Ethernet backbone.
Clusters bundle virtual functions and perform computation-
intensive tasks. In this work, we use a zone topology [1] which
connects all legacy ECUs to a zone controller in their physical
vicinity within the vehicle (e.g., front left).
In such architectures, it is essential that Quality-of-Service
(QoS) guarantees are provided by the network to control
concurrent mixed-critical communication. Time-Sensitive Net-
working (TSN) is a set of standards (see IEEE 802.1Q-2018)
which extend Ethernet with the ability to forward real-time-
and cross-traffic concurrently and is the leading candidate for
deployment in the vehicular world.
Existing CAN-Ethernet gateway solutions embed CAN traf-
fic in application-layer protocols. Kern et al. [4] compare
aggregation strategies for automotive CAN-Ethernet gateways.
For all strategies they send all messages of one CAN bus
via one UDP/IP flow. AUTOSAR specifies Scalable service-
Oriented MiddlewarE over IP (SOME/IP) to transport control
information over Ethernet [5] and recommends embedding the
traditional bus communication using the full SOME/IP header.
In contrast, Herber et al. [6] evaluate sending CAN frames
over AVB streams, which are now integrated in TSN. None
of these approaches exposes context information about the
control flows in networking protocols that are used for the
forwarding decision in the network. Instead, Rumez et al. [7]
integrate access control in automotive gateways that shall filter
unwanted messages based on policies and attributes.
Wang et al. [8] discuss network and communication tech-
nologies for both in-vehicle and Vehicle-to-X (V2X) commu-
nication in the era of autonomous driving. They argue that
more flexibility will be necessary to manage the growing
dynamics of IVNs. Connected cars require new standards for
cyber-security, such as specified in SAE/ISO 21434. Hu et
al. [9] review secure communication approaches for IVNs
including message authentication, encryption, and intrusion
protection. The authors advise for the traditional protective
functions such as intrusion detection, firewalling, and access
control at the network transition between trust zones. We will
show that the network itself can help establishing those trust
zones via admission control and network separation.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) promises to reduce the
complexity of networks and increase the adaptability [10].
Shin et al. [11] review network security enhancements by
SDN, for instance using central dynamic access control, net-
work separation and firewalls. Halba et al. [3] show how SDN
can improve safety and robustness of IVNs. In previous work,
we examined the combination of SDN and TSN for in car
networks [12]. These investigations promised that SDN can
add value to the resilience, security, and adaptivity of the
automotive environment, while its control overhead can be
mitigated without a delay penalty in real-time communication.
Evaluating network security mechanism is always difficult
as it is hard to predict the risk of unknown vulnerabilities [13].
Ruddle et al. [14] present a concept for a security analysis
of automotive on-board networks. Authors derive security
requirements based on dark side attack scenarios. Fundamental
work on the automotive attack surface has been done by
Checkoway et al. [15]. Miller and Valasek [16] analyzed the
remote attack surfaces of many passenger vehicles. In later
work [17], they outlined a remote attack against an unaltered
2014 Jeep Cherokee. Longari et al. [18] introduce a framework
for automotive on-board network risk analysis. Based on an
attack tree built from real-world incidents such as the Miller
and Valasek remote exploits they evaluate how vehicle network
topologies can be hardened by introducing additional gate-
ways. Our work concentrates on reducing the attack surface
by monitoring and separating network communication flows
already on the MAC layer.
III. DESIGN SPACE FOR EMBEDDING CONTROL FLOWS
A Control Flow (CF) is a sequence of messages with the
same identifier in the vehicle communication matrix. Sent from
a single origin, it follows a point to multipoint relation to reach
one or multiple receivers. The source embeds the CF identifier
into packet headers, which allows receivers to identify the
message context.
A Network Flow (NF) is a sequence of related packets
transported from a particular source to a particular destination
in the network. Using multicast a NF can reach multiple sinks
simultaneously. Multicast is a common use case in IVNs, since
the same information is often required at different ECUs.
Network devices identify a NF by matching packet header
fields. In addition of layer 2 addressing, Ethernet switches may
consider VLAN tags. Routers forward according to layer 3
addresses. The OpenFlow pipeline in SDN switches allows to
match all header fields from layer 2 to layer 4. Some SDN
vendors include extensions to the OpenFlow protocol which
allow matching specific bytes within the transport payload.
In this work, we assume that the network consists of SDN
forwarding devices able to precisely match all header fields
from layer 2 to layer 4.
A. Embedding Strategies for Control Flow Information
CAN-Ethernet gateways exchange data between a CAN
Bus and an Ethernet network. For this purpose, the CF is
repackaged between CAN and Ethernet frames. Figure 1
presents two examples for CF embedding on different layers.
Each CF has an identifier, a sender, a priority, and a domain.
L5 - SOME/IP
Msg. ID
(4 Byte)
Payload
(0-1400 Byte)
L4 - UDP
Dst. Port
(2 Byte)
Src. Port
(2 Byte)
L3 - IPv4
DSCP
(6 Bit)
IP Src.
(4 Byte)
IP Dst.
(4 Byte)
CF ID DataSOME/IPSOME/IPCF Priority Sender CF Domain
(a) Hidden SOME/IP tunnel embedding
DataL2 - Ethernet IEEE 802.1Q
MAC Dst
(6 Byte)
MAC Src
(6 Byte)
802.1Q Tag (PCP, VID)
(4 Byte)
EtherType
(2 Byte)
Payload
(42 – 1500 Byte)
CF ID Sender CF Priority Embedded Type Embedded DataCF Domain
(b) Exposed Ethernet embedding
Fig. 1: Embedding strategies for context information about
control flows (CFs) on different layers
Depending on the repackaging, the context of the traffic can
be hidden or exposed for the network.
Hidden embeddings are a common approach for repack-
aging in IVNs which tunnel the data using an application
layer protocol. Figure 1a shows a hidden embedding that uses
SOME/IP as an application-layer tunneling protocol. The CF
id is embedded in the message ID field of the SOME/IP
header and the data is embedded as a payload. The example
uses one UDP socket per domain with reserved UDP ports
for SOME/IP traffic. The IPv4 destination multicast address
contains the domain identifier. The Differentiated Services
Code Point (DSCP) is filled with the CF priority. The Ethernet
header is automatically generated by the IP stack. The stack
can be configured to map a certain DSCP to a PCP for QoS on
layer 2. All CFs of one domain are sent to the same destination
address, which creates a domain tunnel. The resulting NF
is identified based on the sending node and the multicast
destination. The destinations of the NF are the joint group
of the receivers of the CFs in the tunnel.
In contrast, the repackaging can be done in a fully exposed
manner. The gateway embeds the context of the CF in the
packet headers, which are used for the forwarding decision
in the network. Figure 1b shows an exposed embedding in
the Ethernet header. It uses a raw Ethernet socket to have
full control on what context information about the message is
encoded on layer 2. The CF ID is encoded in the destination
MAC as a multicast address. The PCP in the 802.1Q tag is
used to embed the CF priority which enables QoS. A different
virtual lan is created for each domain to strictly separate bus
domains while maintaining the control over each message. We
embed the data of the message inside the layer 2 payload.
The EtherType field contains information about the embedded
data type, such as a custom EtherType for CAN data frame
embedding. The resulting NF identifies exactly one vehicle CF
based on the multicast destination MAC address. The source
and destinations of the NF are equal to sender and receivers
of the transported CF.
B. Separating In-Vehicle Control Flows
The embedded context information inside the packet header
fields that are used for the forwarding decision enables the
network to identify which CF is transported via which NF. In
this work, we compare three integration approaches for control
traffic in Ethernet networks which either use a fully exposed
layer 2 embedding or a hidden SOME/IP tunnel embedding.
The integration approach is the key factor in how precisely
CFs can be separated.
Separation by message performs a fully exposed layer 2
embedding that is used for the forwarding decision in the
network. This way, each CF has its own point to multipoint
NF that can be identified and separated in the network by
matching the multicast destination MAC address.
Separation by domain uses the hidden SOME/IP tunneling
approach and encodes a domain identifier in the destination IP
address. Those domains are already in use in current vehicles
for creating domain buses. The domain of a CF is selected
based on the domain of its sender ECU. For each sender there
is one point to multipoint NF, tunneling all CFs of one domain.
The NFs can be distinguished from others by matching the
source IP and multicast destination IP.
Separation by topic uses the hidden SOME/IP tunneling
approach as well. Topics are groups of similar CFs. In full
CAN bus architectures, each ECU belongs exactly to one
domain bus. Introducing a new domain for CFs also means
creating a new physical domain bus. On an Ethernet backbone,
a new topic only requires a new tunnel on an existing physical
link. With increasing amounts of cross-domain communica-
tion, it seems to be a good idea to introduce new fine-grained
topics for CFs. Smaller groups of CFs than the original vehicle
domains can thus be formed on an Ethernet backbone without
the need for additional wiring. For this work, we assign custom
topic identifiers to each CF in the communication matrix. We
use the same topic identifier for CFs with a common context.
For example, all CFs carrying motor control information are
assigned to the motor control topic and all CFs regarding light
control are assigned the light control topic. There are some
CFs we could not group into topics. For those we create a
separate topic, which only contains the one CF. The topic
identifier is encoded in the multicast IP address. Each topic
has one point to multipoint NF for each sender of the topic.
C. Impact on In-Vehicle Network Design
Higher layer embeddings allow the comfort of using the full
IP stack. If the CF information is embedded on the application
layer it can not be used for forwarding decisions without
violation of the OSI model. Layer 2 information is only valid
in the local IVN, so Ethernet embeddings that do not use
the internet protocol are not routable. This reduces the attack
surface of in-vehicle CFs.
1) Message aggregation: Aggregation is a concept to re-
duce overhead when relatively small control information is
embedded into Ethernet. For example, a CAN message has 8
Byte payload while an Ethernet frame has a minimal size of 64
Bytes which results in 42 byte minimum payload. Kern et al.
compare aggregation strategies including one-to-one mapping
and buffering [4]. Buffered approaches delay messages for a
certain period of time, before they are sent alone or together
with other messages. The one-to-one strategy sends each
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Fig. 2: IVN of a production vehicle transformed to a zone topology consisting of a High Performance Computer (HPC) for
Infotainment (I) and 4 Zone Controllers (ZC) (Front-Left (FL), Front-Right (FR), Rear-Left (RL), Rear-Right (RR))
message in its own Ethernet packet. The results of Kern et
al. show that this results in around 4 times higher bandwidth
usage compared to buffered approaches. On the other hand,
the latency and jitter is increased by buffering. With different
embedding concepts aggregation of control information might
be hindered. Domain tunneling allows aggregation of all
messages of one domain which is the most common approach
to save bandwidth. The finer the separation of CFs, the less
useful aggregation of frames becomes as messages are delayed
and only a small amount of bandwidth is saved.
2) IP fragmentation: Packets that are larger than the max-
imum transfer unit of an Ethernet frame (1500 Byte) are
split into multiple fragments. Only one fragment contains the
transport header. Therefore, transport header fields can only be
used for forwarding decisions in SDN without fragmentation.
Fragment reassembly in forwarding device is not appropriate
in a real-time system.
3) TSN configuration: Control information is often trans-
mitted in cycles and with similar data size. TSN allows to
control the timing of NFs by reserving bandwidth or time-
slots. The reservation is more precise the better CFs can
be differentiated in the network. For exposed embeddings
the timing behavior can be determined much more precisely
than for hidden embeddings, which results in less reservation
overhead. On the other hand, the planning effort for time-slot
calculation increases exponentially with an increasing number
of small time-slots. Aggregation of control information makes
it more difficult to calculate the timings in the network because
of bursts, and varying size and period of packets.
4) Security mechanisms: An exposed embedding can help
other security concepts such as network anomaly detection
systems or deep packet inspection as they can monitor all mes-
sages of specific CFs. Encryption might influence embedding
options. The layers used for the forwarding decision should
not be encrypted, e.g. the IP address can not be used when
the frame is encrypted with MACSec. On the other hand,
encryption might be weakened as the context of the message
is visible for every receiver of the NF.
5) Device integration: If vehicles are upgraded, new func-
tions might require the installation of new ECUs. For sepa-
ration by domain or topic, new devices can join the existing
tunnels. This will enable them to send and receive all CFs
of this tunnel. With separation by message, new devices need
to join each CF to receive them. Also, new CFs might be
introduced to the network. For tunneling approaches, new CFs
only require a new NF if they have a new sender or belong
to a new domain/topic. With separation by message, for each
new CF a new NF has to be created.
IV. EVALUATION
We now compare the different separation concepts at hand
using a realistic IVN with real-world network traces. First, we
evaluate the network configuration generated for our topology
and each separation concept in a quantitative analysis. Second,
we inspect the impact of the separation on a specific vehicle
control flow to show the effect in the case of an attack.
A. Realistic In-Vehicle Network
Figure 2 displays the IVN used in our evaluation, which is
derived from the CAN network of a production car originally
implemented with a central gateway architecture. Our network
is transformed into a zone topology [1]. All CAN ECUs are
grouped into four zones based on their physical location in the
vehicle (Front-Left (FL), Front-Right (FR), Rear-Left (RL),
TABLE I: Number of Network Flows (NFs) created from
integrating (the 242) Control Flows (CFs) in the backbone
Separation # NFs (with
multiple CFs)
# CFs per NFs
Minimum Average Maximum
By Message 242 (0) 1 1 1
By Domain 19 (19) 5 13 37
By Topic 102 (38) 1 3 17
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Fig. 3: Distribution of NFs over visibility at destinations
Rear-Right (RR)). Each zone has one Zone Controller (ZC)
acting as a CAN-Ethernet gateway.
The CAN bus domains are numbered from 1 to 5. Despite
the placement of the CAN-ECUs, the original domain busses
are retained, e.g., CAN 1 on ZC FL and CAN 1 on ZC
FR were originally one domain bus. A High Performance
Computer (HPC) handles the Infotainment (I) system and acts
as a gateway between all CAN ECUs and the infotainment
domain. All ZCs are connected via a software-defined Ethernet
backbone consisting of two switches (Front (F), Rear (R)). An
SDN controller manages the forwarding. Besides the original
CAN network of the production car, we introduce ECUs on
Ethernet for diagnostics and external connectivity.
We generate three different network configurations match-
ing our separation concepts and follow the communication
matrix of our original production vehicle within the network
topology. The messages are played back from recorded CAN
traces of the car. In one configuration, ZCs embed CAN
messages fully exposed on layer 2 to enable separation by
messages. The other two configurations embed the CAN
message in a SOME/IP tunnel and encode the topic or domain
identifier in the multicast IP, enabling separation by topic or
domain. The receiving ZC transforms the packets back to
CAN frames and forwards them to the CAN buses where the
destinations are located.
B. Impact of Control Flow Separation
The focus of our analysis are the CAN Control Flows (CFs)
that traverse the Ethernet backbone. Therefore, we do not
consider local CFs, for which the sender and all receivers are
located within the same zone. In total there are 242 different
CFs forwarded via the software-defined Ethernet backbone.
Table I shows the generated Network Flows (NFs) for
each separation concept in relation to the transported CFs. As
expected, the message separation generates 242 NFs, one for
each CF. Separation by domain generates 19 NFs, one tunnel
for each sender and domain. All of these NFs carry multiple
CFs. The topic separation generates 102 NFs, one tunnel for
each sender and topic. 38 of these NFs carry multiple CFs.
This means that 74 of the topics contain only one CF and
therefore behave exactly like separation by message. The table
also shows the minimum, maximum and average number of
CFs that are sent via one NF. There is always one CF per NF
using message separation. For domain separation, there is a
minimum of 5, average of 13 and maximum of 37 CFs per
NF. This means that there is at least one NF that carries 37 CFs
which cannot be differentiated by the network. As expected,
separation by topic performs somewhere in between domain
and message separation. 74 NFs only carry one CF and at
least one carries 17 CFs. The average is 3 CFs per tunnel.
In the following analysis, separation by message can be used
as a benchmark as it implements exactly the relations of the
communication matrix.
Figure 3 shows the share of NFs that are visible at a
number of destinations not including the sender. The results for
separation by topic and message look very similar. For both, a
quarter of all NFs reaches one gateway, and around 40% reach
fewer than three gateways. With domain separation zero NFs
reach fewer than three gateways, around a third reach exactly
three and nearly 70% reach all gateways in the network. This is
expected because the ECUs of a domain are usually distributed
throughout the vehicle and therefore most domains are present
in every zone. Especially the difference in percentage of flows
reaching all destinations is notable. With topic separation 18%
of NFs reach all destinations, with separation by message
only 11%. This indicates that the separation concept has a
big influence on network overhead as CFs may be forwarded
to destinations that do not need to receive them. It is also a
security issue as those receivers should not be able to receive
the content. Furthermore, multicast seems to be the best option
to transport CFs in a zone topology as less than 30% of all
CFs need to be received by only one gateway.
Table II shows the communication relations between the
gateways. For each destination the CFs from all other gateways
and the total of all CFs to the destination are depicted. The
percentages relate to the maximum CFs that are sent via
the Ethernet backbone. We evaluate the separation concepts
considering the following properties of CFs:
• A CF is legitimate if the CAN source ECU of the CF is
connected to the source gateway and at least one CAN
ECU at all destination gateways is a receiver specified in
the communication matrix.
• A CF is received at a destination after it originated from
an ECU connected to the source.
• An oversupplied CF is surplus and reaches the destina-
tion although it is not needed (received− legitimate).
• A CF is permitted if it could be sent by the source and
would be forwarded to the destination. Even though not
present in our communication matrix, these flows could
be activated by malicious components.
TABLE II: Communication relations between gateways in terms of the received, oversupplied, and permitted CFs for each
separation concept compared to the maximum available, and legitimate CFs
Networking Properties Separation by Message Separation by Topic Separation by Domain
Dest. Src. Maximum Legitimate Received Oversupplied Permitted Received Oversupplied Permitted Received Oversupplied Permitted
ZC FR ZC FL 242 43 (18%) 43 (18%) 0 (0%) 43 (18%) 46 (19%) 3 (1%) 115 (48%) 53 (22%) 10 (4%) 232 (96%)
ZC RL 242 47 (19%) 47 (19%) 0 (0%) 47 (19%) 60 (25%) 13 (5%) 115 (48%) 68 (28%) 21 (9%) 192 (79%)
ZC RR 242 37 (15%) 37 (15%) 0 (0%) 37 (15%) 42 (17%) 5 (2%) 102 (42%) 46 (19%) 9 (4%) 213 (88%)
HPC I 242 10 (4%) 10 (4%) 0 (0%) 10 (4%) 10 (4%) 0 (0%) 10 (4%) 10 (4%) 0 (0%) 10 (4%)
Total 968 137 (14%) 137 (14%) 0 (0%) 137 (14%) 158 (16%) 21 (2%) 342 (35%) 177 (18%) 40 (4%) 647 (67%)
ZC FL ZC FR 242 54 (22%) 54 (22%) 0 (0%) 54 (22%) 60 (25%) 6 (2%) 139 (57%) 65 (27%) 11 (5%) 232 (96%)
ZC RL 242 59 (24%) 59 (24%) 0 (0%) 59 (24%) 64 (26%) 5 (2%) 122 (50%) 68 (28%) 9 (4%) 192 (79%)
ZC RR 242 37 (15%) 37 (15%) 0 (0%) 37 (15%) 42 (17%) 5 (2%) 98 (40%) 46 (19%) 9 (4%) 213 (88%)
HPC I 242 5 (2%) 5 (2%) 0 (0%) 5 (2%) 5 (2%) 0 (0%) 5 (2%) 10 (4%) 5 (2%) 10 (4%)
Total 968 155 (16%) 155 (16%) 0 (0%) 155 (16%) 171 (18%) 16 (2%) 364 (38%) 189 (20%) 34 (4%) 647 (67%)
ZC RL ZC FR 242 49 (20%) 49 (20%) 0 (0%) 49 (20%) 58 (24%) 9 (4%) 113 (47%) 65 (27%) 16 (7%) 232 (96%)
ZC FL 242 39 (16%) 39 (16%) 0 (0%) 39 (16%) 46 (19%) 7 (3%) 115 (48%) 53 (22%) 14 (6%) 232 (96%)
ZC RR 242 31 (13%) 31 (13%) 0 (0%) 31 (13%) 43 (18%) 12 (5%) 107 (44%) 46 (19%) 15 (6%) 213 (88%)
HPC I 242 4 (2%) 4 (2%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 4 (2%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 10 (4%) 6 (2%) 10 (4%)
Total 968 123 (13%) 123 (13%) 0 (0%) 123 (13%) 151 (16%) 28 (3%) 339 (35%) 174 (18%) 51 (5%) 687 (71%)
ZC RR ZC FR 242 50 (21%) 50 (21%) 0 (0%) 50 (21%) 55 (23%) 5 (2%) 106 (44%) 65 (27%) 15 (6%) 232 (96%)
ZC FL 242 41 (17%) 41 (17%) 0 (0%) 41 (17%) 45 (19%) 4 (2%) 117 (48%) 53 (22%) 12 (5%) 232 (96%)
ZC RL 242 39 (16%) 39 (16%) 0 (0%) 39 (16%) 54 (22%) 15 (6%) 103 (43%) 68 (28%) 29 (12%) 192 (79%)
HPC I 242 4 (2%) 4 (2%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 4 (2%) 0 (0%) 4 (2%) 10 (4%) 6 (2%) 10 (4%)
Total 968 134 (14%) 134 (14%) 0 (0%) 134 (14%) 158 (16%) 24 (2%) 330 (34%) 196 (20%) 62 (6%) 666 (69%)
HPC I ZC FR 242 8 (3%) 8 (3%) 0 (0%) 8 (3%) 19 (8%) 11 (5%) 26 (11%) 40 (17%) 32 (13%) 90 (37%)
ZC FL 242 11 (5%) 11 (5%) 0 (0%) 11 (5%) 19 (8%) 8 (3%) 26 (11%) 53 (22%) 42 (17%) 232 (96%)
ZC RL 242 8 (3%) 8 (3%) 0 (0%) 8 (3%) 18 (7%) 10 (4%) 39 (16%) 51 (21%) 43 (18%) 131 (54%)
ZC RR 242 6 (2%) 6 (2%) 0 (0%) 6 (2%) 14 (6%) 8 (3%) 16 (7%) 35 (14%) 29 (12%) 132 (55%)
Total 968 33 (3%) 33 (3%) 0 (0%) 33 (3%) 70 (7%) 37 (4%) 107 (11%) 179 (18%) 146 (15%) 585 (60%)
All Total 4840 582 (12%) 582 (12%) 0 (0%) 582 (12%) 708 (15%) 126 (3%) 1482 (31%) 915 (19%) 333 (7%) 3232 (67%)
For further illustration of the table, we take a closer look
at the CFs with the destination ZC FR and the source ZC FL
marked as yellow line. Each gateway forwards a maximum of
242 CFs from CAN buses to other gateways via the Ethernet
backbone. There are 43 CFs from ZC FR to ZC FL specified
in the communication matrix according to the placement of
the CAN ECUs in our topology. With separation by message,
the same 43 CFs (18% of 242) are received by ZC FL from
ZC FR, so the oversupply is zero.
For tunneling approaches, CFs are forwarded to gateways
that are subscribed the multicast group, even though for other
CFs. Hence with separation by domain, ZC FL receives 53
CFs from ZC FR, 10 of which are oversupplied CFs (4%
of the maximum 242). With topic separation the oversupply
is only 3 CFs. If a source sends one CF of a tunnel, the
network also permits the sending of all other CFs of the NF.
Separation by domain permits 232 CFs from ZC FR to ZC
FR, which is 96% of all CFs. This adds 189 CFs to the 43
legitimate. Topic separation permits 115 CFs, which are 72
too many. Separation by message only permits the sending of
the legitimately specified 43 CFs.
We also calculate the total amount of CFs received, over-
supplied, and permitted for each destination, for example ZC
FR marked in green. Since 4 sources are always consid-
ered for each destination, the maximum possible CFs to the
destinations are 4 times 242, which is 968. The zone FR
requires a total of 137 CFs. When separated by message
it receives the same 137 CFS, 158 by topic, and 177 by
domain. This results in a total of 21 CFs oversupplied to ZC
FR with topic separation, and 40 with separation by domain.
For permitted flows the difference is more extreme as the
hidden embeddings allow a lot more messages compared to
the exposed embedding. For topics there are 342 permitted
CFs which is 205 more than legitimate. For domain tunneling
647 CFs are permitted to the destination ZC FR which is 510
surplus CFs that can reach the destination ZC FR.
The totals for the whole network sum up all CFs between
all nodes and are marked in red. As explained earlier, NFs are
point to multipoint relations. This is why for 242 maximum
CFs there are 582 legitimate CFs from all sources to all
destinations. For the whole network 4840 CFs would be
possible as each source could send a maximum of 242 CFs
to each destination. This is also reflected by the message
separation while for topic separation 708 and for domain
separation 915 CFs reach the destinations.
Figure 4 visualizes the shares of legitimate, oversupplied,
permitted and forbidden CFs in relation to the maximum pos-
sible CFs in the three cases marked in Table II. A forbidden
CF is filtered by the backbone and is not forwarded from
the source to the destination. All three cases clearly show
the effectiveness of the strict message separation via exposed
embedding. When separated by message, the software-defined
backbone only forwards the legitimate CFs and forbids any
other CF. The hidden application layer embeddings oversupply
and permit illegitimate CFs. This leads to fewer CFs that are
forbidden, while still only CFs of the tunnels that are already in
use by the sending nodes are allowed by the network. More
precisely, topics can improve the separation of flows in the
network. As stated earlier, we chose our topics by grouping
similar messages in the communication matrix. There are some
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Fig. 4: Share of legitimate, oversupplied, permitted, and for-
bidden CFs in the three cases marked in Table II
CFs we could not group into topics. This impacts the results
for the separation as those CFs are perfectly separated by their
own topic with only one CF.
Gateways can filter the unneeded CFs at the cost of pro-
cessing power so that no unwanted message reach a CAN
bus. Still, the network load on the backbone increases due
to the oversupplied control traffic. In the third case, 12%
of the maximum CFs from all sources to all destinations
are legitimate. With separation by topic additional 3% are
received at the destinations, with domain separation around
7%. Network load on the backbone increases by 57% with
domain separation, and by 27% when separated by topic as
compared to the legitimate CFs.
These results clearly conflict with the benefits of aggrega-
tion, which is one of the main arguments for using a hidden
embedding. Above all, it is a security issue that network nodes
get exposed to messages they are not prepared for. This is
especially the case for HPC I which receives an oversupply of
37 CFs when separated by topic and 146 CFs when separated
by domain. This is twice as many received CFs with topic
separation compared to the legitimate CFs and over four times
as many with domain separation. The separation by message
is the only concept able to solve this problem with zero
oversupplies. More fine-grained tunneling could lead to better
separation. However, this approach also reduces the advantages
of application layer tunneling such as easier setup with higher
layer sockets, the possibility to aggregate, and fewer NFs.
From a security perspective, the CFs that a (malicious)
ECU can send are even more important than the CFs it can
receive. From all sources to all destinations, 31% of all CFs are
allowed with topic separation and even 67% with separation by
domain, while only 12% are needed. The domain separation
with a total of 3232 allowed CFs on the network results
in a 455% increase in permitted CFs compared to the 582
legitimate CFs on the backbone. For topic tunnels there are
1482 permitted CFs which is an increase of 155%. However,
the difference is not as drastic for CFs permitted from HPC I,
which in every separation concept can only send CFs of the
infotainment domain to the other gateways. Still, this shows
the security weakness of the tunneling approach. When a
device participates in a tunnel, it can listen to all CFs of this
tunnel and is permitted to send all CFs of the tunnel.
Fewer filtering of CFs eases attacks as fewer ECUs need to
be compromised to gain control over the car. Even if gateways
filter all unwanted and illegally sent messages it would still be
possible to attack the NFs, e.g., by flooding the tunnels to delay
time-critical flows. In the case of exposed embeddings, which
fully isolates messages by SDN, attackers must compromise
the exact sender of each CF in the Ethernet backbone to issue
messages in this channel.
The presented zone topology with an enforced separation
of messages by SDN is also more secure than the original
network architecture of our production vehicle. In a pure CAN
bus architecture, the traffic on buses cannot be controlled.
All ECUs connected to a domain bus can send any CF and
receive all messages on the bus. A compromised ECU can
attack all other ECUs in its domain. Gateways can use the
CAN IDs to filter which messages are to be forwarded to
another bus, but cannot verify the correct sender of a CF. The
zone topology splits the CAN domain buses so that less ECUs
connected to a physical bus, which allows the zone controllers
to filter messages and less ECUs are completely unprotected.
If each ECU were directly connected to the zone controller,
the correct sender could be verified. Combined with separation
of messages by SDN, this could offer a perfect separation of
CFs and thus a trustworthy communication backbone.
C. Case Study: Impact on a Critical Vehicle Control Flow
To illustrate how CF separation can reduce the attack surface
of an IVN, we now pick critical CFs often used in attack
scenarios from known exploitations against passenger vehicles
such as [17]. We select the acceleration request as a sample
CF, which we examine in two different cases. The first case
assumes a compromised CAN ECU. We discover all CAN
ECUs that are allowed to send the acceleration request to
the original recipients. Second, an Ethernet node could be
compromised. We discover which gateways can send the
acceleration request to the original receivers via Ethernet.
The acceleration request is sent by the Adaptive Cruise
Control (ACC) connected to ZC FL. ECUs connected to the
gateways ZC FR and ZC RR require the CF. A compromised
CAN ECU can be in the same or a different zone and domain
from the target ECU. If the compromised ECU is connected to
the same physical bus as the original source or the destination
of the CF, the attack can not be prevented. This is the case for
7 CAN ECUs in our topology. If the compromised ECU is not
on the same physical bus, the gateway connected to the source
ECU can filter illegitimate CFs. If the compromised CAN ECU
is in a different zone the CF is forwarded over the Ethernet
backbone. There is only one additional ECU that can send
the acceleration request with separation by message on the
backbone. With separation by domain, the backbone forwards
the CF from 29 additional ECUs with separation by topic 11.
Still, all those would be filtered in the source and destination
gateways, except the one also permitted with separation by
message. This shows the impact of the zone topology. Dividing
the domain buses into separate zones allows the gateways to
filter messages. If all ECUs were directly connected to a ZC, it
could precisely identify each sender and their permitted CFs.
In case of a compromised gateway, the CFs can only
be protected by the Ethernet backbone. With separation by
message the acceleration request is only received at the two
gateways ZC FR and ZC RR which require the information.
Both hidden embeddings lead to oversupply of this critical
CF. With separation by topic the CF is additionally forwarded
to HPC I, with separation by domain to ZC RL and HPC
I. Only the original sender (ZC FL) is allowed to send the
acceleration request with message separation. With domain
and topic separation, ZC RL and ZC FR are also allowed to
send the command and it is forwarded to the three other ZCs.
The communication relations for this example show the
benefits of an exposed embedding over hidden embeddings
in tunneling protocols. Hidden embeddings lead to unwanted
receivers of critical CFs and permit their transmission from
other network participants which is a risk for safety and
security. An exposed embedding enables the separation of all
CFs in the network and can establish a trust zone between
the gateways, so that only the original sending gateway is
permitted to send the CF and it reaches only the necessary
destinations. This improves network security even in the case
of a compromised gateway.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this work, we comparatively analyzed three strategies
for integrating separated control flows in a software-defined
Ethernet backbone. We evaluated each separation concept
in a real-world IVN, which we transformed into a modern
software-defined Ethernet topology. The analysis showed that
embedding of exposed control flow information into the header
fields can be matched by forwarding devices and improves
network security and performance. Hidden embeddings in
application-layer tunneling protocols have a significant over-
supply of surplus control flows which opens a security gap.
In detail, we could clearly show that exposing control
flow identifiers to layer-2 packet headers allows for precise
identification of each vehicle control message and protect the
information with a precise access control. Furthermore, a fine-
grained control flow separation improves the precision in real-
time configuration. In contrast, application layer encapsulation
using SOME/IP obfuscates control flows for IVNs and pre-
vents a separate management of flows at the price of network
security and performance. A detailed case study confirmed
that a precise and exposed control flow embedding allows for
isolated communication contexts across the backbone and can
establish trust zones between the gateways.
In future work, we will extend this analysis to cover a
broader variety of in-vehicle communication flows and to
advance the security in cars by additional network layer
intelligence.
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